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I.

INTRODUCTION
Venue plays a major role in federal criminal procedure and

is controlled by constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules.1
Venue has been discussed since the 1700s and continues to play a
vital role in the litigation process.2

In 1769,

Parliament

established that a defendant had the right to a trial by jurors
who were located in the district where the crime was committed.3
In an attempt to mitigate the chances of war, Parliament
proposed taking defendants to England or to another colony for

1

See 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE § 301, (4th ed. 2006) (detailing how finding a

proper venue in a criminal case is often controlled by several
components outside of historic reasoning).
2

See id. (discussing that what seems to be a simple element of

the legal justice system is sometimes quite challenging and has
been a topic of discussion for several centuries).
3

See id. (stressing that defendants had the right to a trial by

jurors in the proximity of the location of the alleged crime.
This rule found in the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
the criminal defendant so that the government cannot bring a
lawsuit in a district foreign to the defendant).

1

trial in treason cases.4

On May 16, 1769, the Virginia House of

Burgess adopted the Virginia Resolves which ensured that jurors
could only be selected in the district where the crime was
committed.5

Alongside Virginia, the other colonies adopted

similar statements and by 1776 the Declaration of Independence
was drafted and George III’s methodology was denounced.6
Pursuant to 18 United States Code § 3237(a) “Any offense
involving the use of. . . transportation in interstate or
foreign commerce. . . is a continuing offense and, except as
otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be
inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or
into which such commerce. . .

4

moves.”7

In criminal cases

See id. (explaining that Parliament attempted to try Americans

overseas and in other colonies to lower the chances of uproar
and war.)
5

See id. (discussing the importance of having jurors selected in

the district where the crime was committed to unburden the
defendant, jurors, and witnesses).
6

See id. (arguing that the colonies followed in the footsteps of

Virginia and rejected George III’s practice of sending
defendants back to Europe to be tried in a district where the
crime was not committed).
7

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237 (West 2019) (detailing Congress’s

2

involving murder or manslaughter venue is often determined by
the location of the crime.8

In civil cases venue is decided by

where the defendant lives or does business.9
decided 30,000 feet above the ground?10

But how is venue

This is the dilemma the

Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits faced.11

In this circuit

decision to implement 18 United States Code § 3237(a) to
establish a means of finding proper venue in crimes involving
transportation).
8

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3236 (West 2019) (establishing that the place

where the death happened determined the jurisdiction of the
court on an indictment for murder or manslaughter).
9

See 28 U.S. 1391 (West 2019) (providing that in a civil case

the venue statute is designed to hinder the plaintiff from
selecting an inconvenient district to pursue a lawsuit against
the defendant).
10

See Katherine Carey, High (Flying) Crimes: Where is Venue

Proper for Crimes Committed on an Airplane in Flight?, SUNDAY
SPLITS (Nov. 17, 2019), http://sundaysplits.com/author/katherinecarey) (questioning how courts decided venue when a crime is
committed above ground in transportation).
11

See id. (discussing the undue burden and hardship on the

defendant when venue is not decided exactly where the crime took
place).

3

split, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits found proper venue in the
district in which the airplane landed.12

On the other hand, the

Ninth Circuit found proper venue over the exact district in
which the crime took place.13
This Comment argues that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
correctly applied the two-part Rodriguez-Moreno test in
connection with 18 U.S. Code § 3237(a) and the Ninth Circuit
Court incorrectly ruled on proper venue.14
brief overview of venue.15

12

Part II describes a

Additionally, Part II gives an

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th

Cir. 2004) (holding that venue can only be proper in the
district where the airplane landed or in any district that the
plane flew over to ensure fairness to the defendant, witnesses,
and jurors).
13

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (holding that venue is only proper in the district over
which the plane was flying when the crime occurred).
14

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237 (West) (establishing that crimes

committed across several districts does not invoke an argument
of improver venue, but rather that any district in which the
transport traveled can be a potential venue location).
15

See infra Part II (describing the important role venue plays

in the constitutional right to a fair trial); see generally, 2

4

overview in the understanding of the Sixth Amendment,
specifically “any district wherein the crime shall have been
committed. . .”16

Part II also analyzes the Rodriquez-Moreno

test and gives an overview of the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuit cases in dispute.17

Part III discusses the circuit’s

interest and reasoning and also discusses the pros and cons of
finding venue where the plane lands versus finding venue exactly
where the crime was committed.18

Part IV argues that improper

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE § 301, (4th ed. 2006) (detailing the history of venue in
the United States and how, when, and why the Colonies had to
adopt their own provisional statues separate from England).
16

See infra Part II (reviewing the language found in the Sixth

Amendment and how it relates to venue and crimes committed on a
plane); see generally, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237 (West 2019)
(interpreting the statutory language to distinguish what the
Supreme Courts case law).
17

See infra Part II United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S.

275, 273 (1999) (explaining the courts intention for creating
the Rodriquez-Moreno test).
18

See infra Part III United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249

(11th Cir. 2004) (finding proper venue in the district where the
airplane landed); see also United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d

5

venue can result in an unfair burden and undue hardship on
criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment.19

Also, Part IV

recommends that SCOTUS should rule in favor of finding venue
where the plane lands and abolish finding venue in the air
altogether.20

Part V concludes by reiterating that the circuits

should adopt the holdings in the Tenth and Eleventh circuits and
find venue where the plane lands.21
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

History of Establishing Venue

The Framers could have never predicted the difficulty it

1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 2019)(holding that venue is only proper in
the district over which the plane was flying when the crime
occurred).
19

See infra Part IV U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing that it

is unconstitutional to inflict unfair burden and undue hardship
on criminal defendants).
20

See infra Part IV (voicing the need to find in favor of the

Tenth and Eleventh Circuits ruling and eliminate the Ninth
Circuits holding and reasoning).
21

See infra Part V (concluding that other courts should find

venue where the plane lands).

6

would be to find proper venue in today’s society.22

The Framers

wanted trials to be held in the jurisdiction of the defendant’s
residence since that may be where the witnesses would be
located.23

In the eighteenth century most crimes were committed

at the place where the defendant resided.24

In Hyde v. Shine,

the Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia had jurisdiction over the conspiracy offense because
the conspiracy was allegedly entered into the city of
Washington.25

22

Justice Brown argued that having a defendant

See 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE § 301, (4th ed. 2006) (analyzing the

difficulty of finding a proper venue because of the growth of
population and the expansion of crime in today’s society).
23

See id. (discussing how trials were to be conducted in the

jurisdiction of the defendant).
24

See 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE § 301, (4th ed. 2006) (describing how during

the eighteenth-century most crimes were committed at the place
where the defendant lived making the determination of venue much
easier unlike today).
25

See Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 78, (1905) (ruling that the

United States Supreme Court does not wish to be understood as
approving the practice of indicting citizens of distant states).

7

travel across the country to a foreign environment is not only
unfair to him but his witnesses which is opposite of the Framers
initial intention found in the Constitution.26
Today, as crime continues to skyrocket, it is becoming more
difficult to conform with the Constitution because crimes are
often committed across districts and continents.27

Today,

criminal cases must be prosecuted in the district in which the
alleged crime was committed.28

However, in the event that a

crime takes place in an airplane, Congress has provided a means
for finding venue.29

26

Under 18 United States Code § 3237(a), the

See id. at 80 (emphasizing the courts concern by highlighting

the burden that would be placed on the defendant if venue was
found outside of the jurisdiction the crime was committed).
27

See id. (explaining how it is difficult to conform with the

Framers reasoning of finding venue in the district where the
crime was committed found in the Constitution).
28

See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 273

(1999) (establishing that a criminal case must be heard in the
district where the crime took place to ensure a fair trial to
the defendant and easier access to witnesses and jurors).
29

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th

Cir. 2004) (explaining how Congress has instituted a process
found under 18 United States Code § 3237(a) in which to find

8

government need only prove that the alleged crime took place on
a form of transportation in interstate commerce.30
B.

Crimes Committed on Airplanes
1.

Finding Venue Where the Plane Lands

In United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether venue for indictment is
restricted to where the weapon was conveyed or utilized, or if
proper venue was in any district where the crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime occurred.31

The Supreme Court ruled in

favor of the government in finding that venue could be found in
any district in which the crime occurred.32

venue for cases involving transportation in interstate
commerce).
30

See United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 349–50 (11th Cir.

1982) (establishing that the government has the burden to show
that the crime took place on a form of transportation in
interstate commerce).
31

See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 273

(1999) (discussing the issue presented to the Supreme Court in
the case of United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno).
32

See Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 277 (held that venue in

prosecution for using or carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence is proper in any district where

9

The Supreme Court has provided a two-part inquiry to
determine in which district the alleged crime was committed, and
therefore, in which district venue is proper.33

A court must

first identify the conduct constituting the offense (the nature
of the crime), and then the court must discern the location of
the commission of the criminal acts.34
In determining the proper venue in a criminal prosecution
not involving airplane crimes, the Supreme Court restated the
test set forth in United States v. Cabrales, the locus
delicti [of the charged offense] must be determined from the
type of crime alleged and the location of the act or acts

the crime of violence was committed).
33

See id. at 276 (holding that Missouri was not a place of

proper venue for money laundering offenses which were begun,
conducted and completed in Florida, when defendant deposited and
withdrew money from Florida bank).
34

See Katherine Carey, High (Flying) Crimes: Where is Venue

Proper for Crimes Committed on an Airplane in Flight?, SUNDAY
SPLITS (Nov. 17, 2019), http://sundaysplits.com/author/katherinecarey/) (quoting how a court must identify the conduct
constituting the offense and discern the location of the
criminal act).

10

constituting it.35

The court held that, in performing this

inquiry, one must identify the offense (the nature

of the

crime) and then discern the location of the crime.36
Federal law enforcement has tracked a significant increase
in sexual assaults on airplanes in the recent years.37

Over 50

years ago Congress recognized the continued problem and
initiated and passed legislation to protect flight crews and
passengers from serious crimes.38

35

Throughout the years, Congress

See United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 110 (1998)

(discussing how the Supreme Court followed the holding in United
States v. Cabrales to distinguish the nature of the crime and
the location of the crime to establish the holding in United
States v. Rodriguez-Moreno).
36

See id. at 120 (holding that in order to prove the defendant

was in violation, the Government had to show that the defendant
used a firearm in connection with the kidnapping of the victim).
37

See Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, FBI (Apr. 26, 2018),

https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/raising-awareness-about-sexualassau lt-aboard-aircraft-042618 (reporting that sexual assaults
aboard an aircraft are a growing concern in the United States).
38

See Federal Aviation Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-

197, 75 Stat. 466, 466–68 (describing the initiation of
legislation to protect flight crew members and passengers aboard

11

extended the application to include assault cases.39

In the

Federal Aviation Act Amendments, policymakers urge Congress to
enact a law to find venue where the plane lands so that more
criminals can be convicted.40

The policymakers argue that the

statute will eliminate any dispute on venue in regards to crimes
committed on a plane.41

The plane would be met by Federal

officers upon landing and the accused could be taken into
custody and the criminal proceedings could commence
immediately.42

This was the case in United States v.

a plane).
39

See Federal Aviation Act Amendments (discussing the history of

the Act and the recent Amendments to ensure safety to all aboard
the plane during a crime).
40

See Federal Aviation Act Amendments (arguing how Congress must

find in favor of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and find venue
where the plane lands).
41

See Federal Aviation Act Amendments (discussing how finding

venue where the plane lands will eliminate any minute
technicalities and allow for a swifter justice procedure).
42

See Federal Aviation Act Amendments (suggesting if venue is

found where the plane lands how quick and easy the process will
begin and how much quicker justice would be attained for the
victim(s)).

12

Breitweiser.43
On January 26, 2004 Russel Breitweiser was convicted of
abusive sexual contact with a minor and simple assault of a
minor.44

Breitweiser had assaulted fourteen-year-old A.B. while

on a flight from Houston International Airport to HartsfieldJackson Atlanta International Airport.45

On appeal Breitweiser

argued that the district court erred in finding proper venue.46
The court established that the government met its burden for
proving proper venue by establishing that Breitweiser committed
crimes on an airplane that landed in Georgia.47

Further, the

court argued that it would be impossible for the government to

43

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.

2004) (emphasizing how the defendant was met by officers upon
landing and taken into custody).
44

See id. (discussing how a jury found Breitweiser guilty and

allowed the government to bring the case in anyone of the
districts in which the crime allegedly took place).
45

See Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 at 1255 (describing the events

that led up to Breitweiser’s conviction).
46

See id. (disagreeing with the court and asserting that the

case should be reversed and remanded).
47

See id. (reiterating how the government met its burden of

proof by establishing that the plane landed in Georgia).

13

prove exactly where the crimes were committed.48
relied heavily on the findings in McCulley.49

The court

The court

concluded that the district court correctly found that there was
venue in Georgia under § 3237(a).50
In Cope, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Cope’s conviction for
operating a commercial airplane while under the influence of
alcohol.51

The court rejected his argument of improper venue in

the District of Colorado.52

48

In applying Breitweiser, the court

See id. (arguing how it would be impossible for the government

to pinpoint exactly when and where the crime took place during
the flight).
49

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.

2004) (discussing how § 3237 was established to ensure that
criminal cases could not be dismissed on a simple technicality).
50

See Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 at 1260 (holding that the

district court ruled correctly in finding venue under § 3237(a)
to prosecute the case in the district in which the crime was
possibly committed).
51

United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1221 (2012) (defining

under Title 18 United States Code § 341 that a person will be
considered to be under the influence of alcohol with a blood
alcohol count of .10 percent or higher).
52

See Cope, 676 F.3d at 1222 (disagreeing with Cope’s argument

14

found that Cope committed the offense while operating the plane
in interstate commerce.53

The government had the choice of

finding venue in any district Cope had traveled “from, through,
or into,” which included the District of Colorado where the
plane landed.54
2.

Finding Venue Where the Crime Was Committed

In United States v. Lozoya, the defendant was arrested and
convicted of inflight simple assault in the Central District of
California where the plane landed.55

On review Lozoya rejected

the Court found venue proper in the district of Georgia pursuant
to § 3237(a), citing Breitweiser for the proposition that the
government must prove that the crime took place on an airplane
in interstate commerce).
53

See id. (holding that as long as the government could

establish that Cope committed the crime interstate commerce then
he could be tried in anyone of the districts in which the plane
flew over).
54

See Cope, 676 F.3d at 1222 (discussing how the prosecution

could have found venue in any jurisdiction across the flight
plan).
55

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (holding that the defendant was guilty of inflight simple
assault in the proper venue).

15

the Courts holding and argued improper venue.56

The Ninth

Circuit found the provisions of § 3237(a) to be inapplicable to
establish venue in that district.57

Specifically, after applying

the Rodriguez-Moreno test, the Court disagreed with the
statutory language “[continuing] offenses involving. .
.transportation in interstate or foreign commerce.”58
The Ninth Circuit determined that (1) as to the nature of
the assault, Lozoya committed a single, instantaneous offense
which, though it occurred on a plane. . . did not implicate
interstate or foreign commerce, and (2) partly because of its
instantaneous nature, the crime was likely committed only in the
district over which the plane was flying at the time of the
offense.59

56

Accordingly, the Court held venue would be proper

See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1234 (discussing respondent’s

disagreement with the lower courts holding).
57

See id. (rejecting the statutory interpretation, the Ninth

Circuit found the provision to be inapplicable to their case).
58

See id. (comparing the Rodriguez- Moreno test, the Court found

a different interpretation of the statutory language).
59

See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1234 (discussing how a crime on a

plane does not implicate interstate commerce, and the likelihood
that the crime was committed in a district where the plane was
flying at the time).

16

only in the district over which the plane was flying when the
crime occurred and reversed Lozoya’s conviction on the grounds
of improper venue.60

III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits Were Correct in
Finding Venue Where the Plane Lands Because They
Properly Identified the Conduct of the Offense and
Correctly Discerned the Location of the Criminal Act

The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits correctly interpreted the
plain language of 18 United States Code § 3237(a) because they
found proper venue where the plane landed.61

When looking at the

plain language of 18 United States Code § 3237(a), it is
difficult to come to any conclusion other than that of the Tenth

60

See id. (holding that venue could only be proper in the

district where the crime occurred and reversed and remanded the
district court’s holding).
61

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.

2004) (discussing how a jury found Breitweiser guilty of abusive
sexual contact with a minor and simple assault of a minor while
aboard an airplane); see also United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d
1219, 1221 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that Cope was guilty for
operating a commercial airplane while under the influence of
alcohol).

17

and Eleventh Circuits because they properly identified the
conduct constituting the offense and then discerned the location
of the commission of the criminal act.62

18 United States Code §

3237(a) clearly states that, “any offense against the United
States . . . may be prosecuted in any district in which such
offense was begun, continued, or completed.”63

Additionally, 18

United States Code § 3237(a)- “any offense involving the use of
. . . transportation in interstate or foreign commerce . . . is
a continuing offense . . . and may be . . . prosecuted in any
district from, etc. . . moves.”64

62

Based on the statutory

Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237 (West 2019) (stressing the need to

prosecute in any district where the offense might have occurred)
and Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1221, (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that
proper venue is valid in any district upon with Cope had flown
over), with Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004)
(discussing how venue should be found where the plane landed).
63

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237 (West) (quoting the first prong of §

3237 and describing the ability to bring a claim in any of the
districts in which a crime was begun).
64

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237 (West) (quoting the second prong of §

3237 and explaining that any crime involving the use of
transportation in interstate or international commerce is a
continuing offense and liable to prosecution in any district

18

language, it is clear that the Supreme Court was most concerned
with ensuring that a defendant did not get away with a crime
simply because proper venue could not be established.65

One can

argue that limiting venue where the defendant and potential
witnesses have zero ties can inflict an unfair burden and undue
hardship.66

In contrast, Judge Owens in Lozoya correctly argued

that a prosecution in the landing district constitutes no type
of discrimination towards defendants and the defendant can
inquire a relocation of the venue if they sincerely feel
inconvenienced.67

from, through, or into such commerce).
65

See John, Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Aircraft: Under What

Jurisdiction Are They Punishable?, AM. BAR ASSOC. J., 37(4), 257327 (1951) (discussing the courts’ desire to attain fairness for
both the defendant and the plaintiff but still ensure justice so
that the criminal is punished).
66

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (holding that having a limiting venue can result in an
undue burden and unfair hardships not only to the defendant but
also to the witnesses who may be called upon to testify).
67

See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1234 (discussing how a defendant and

her witnesses might be burdened by an opposing venue selection,
but argued that if she is truly inconvenienced, she can request

19

The Constitution and the Sixth Amendment guarantee criminal
defendants the right to be tried in the district in which the
crime was committed.68

To establish venue, the government need

only show that the crime took place on a form of transportation
in interstate commerce.69

Under Rodriguez-Moreno and 18 United

States Code § 3237(a) the government met its burden by showing
that Breitweiser committed the crimes on an airplane that
ultimately landed in Georgia.70

The Court ruled correctly

because ultimately it would be impossible for the government to
prove exactly where the crime was committed.71

Additionally, the

a transfer in venue).
68

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.

2004) (explaining how the Court disagreed with Breitweiser
although he had a right to argue that his case should be tried
where the crime was committed).
69

See id. (establishing that because it was proven that

Breitweiser committed the crime on the plane, the government was
able to establish venue in the district of its choosing).
70

See id. (reiterating that the government did not need to prove

exactly where the crime occurred only that the crime occurred
while on flight the airplane).
71

See id. (demonstrating that the Ninth Circuit court ruled

incorrectly in finding venue because there is no precise way of

20

Court correctly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning because
the crimes were continuing offenses and not point-in-time
offenses.72

Where a crime consists of distinct parts which have

different localities, the offense may be tried where any part
was committed.73

The Court concluded that venue could be

established in any of the districts where the kidnapping
occurred.74

proving exactly which federal district was beneath the place at
the time the crime took place).
72

See JIMMY GURULÉ, MARK H. BONNER & LAURIE LEVENSON, COMPLEX CRIMINAL

LITIGATION: PROSECUTING DRUG ENTERPRISES

AND

ORGANIZE CRIME, 236 (3rd ed.

2013) (defining how a point-in-time offense is committed in the
place where the kidnapping and the use of the gun coincided and
a continuing offense is a crime that crossed district, borders,
regions).
73

See id. at 237 (distinguishing the proper usage of the

Rodriguez-Moreno inquiry that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
adopted versus the improper usage of the inquiry that the Ninth
Circuit adopted).
74

See United Sates v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 282 (1999)

(holding that although the kidnapping initiated in one district,
because it crossed interstate commerce any of the districts were
available for proper venue).

21

B.

The Ninth Circuit Was Incorrect in Finding Venue Where
the Crime Was Committed Because They Did Not Properly
Identify the Location of the Criminal Act

The Ninth Circuit incorrectly ruled on venue because the
crime took place while the plane was in flight and landed in the
district where the plaintiff brought the suit.75

The court

incorrectly applied the Rodriguez-Moreno inquiry because the
court found that because the assault took place before the
aircraft entered the district’s airspace, so the venue could not
be found where the plane landed.76

Additionally, the court

argued that the assault occurred in an instant and likely in the
airspace of only one district, and the government did not prove
that any part of that assault occurred once the aircraft entered
the airspace over the Central District; indeed, it concedes that
the assault ended before then.77

75

The court incorrectly applied §

See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1234 (disagreeing with the Tenth and

Eleventh Circuits reasoning, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case
on the grounds of improper venue).
76

See id. at 1239 (arguing that the assault did not occur within

the Central District of California because the Court held that
airspace is jurisdictionally apart of the district it passes
through).
77

See id. at 1237 (disagreeing with the government, the court

found that you must bring the claim in the same district in

22

3237(a) by arguing that it did not provide a basis for extending
venue because the aircraft continued into its airspace after the
offense was complete.78

Also, the court found that once the

crime was committed any subsequent activity was incidental and
irrelevant for venue purposes.79

This argument should be

rejected because the statute makes clear that an offense is a
continuing offense and can be inquired or prosecuted in any
district.80
The court determined that § 3237(a)’s second paragraph
supported the government’s position.81

However, the court argued

that the paragraph, in relevant part, pertains to “offense[s]

which the crime took place).
78

See id. at 1235 (reiterating that the court incorrectly

applied the Rodriguez-Moreno inquiry and misinterpreted the
test).
79

See id. at 1230 (discussing how when a crime can only be

committed in one location and cannot travel across commerce).
80

See United Sates v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 1234

(1999) (arguing that the Ninth Circuits interpretation and
application of the Rodriguez-Moreno inquiry is incorrect and
should be rejected).
81

See id. at 1235 (agreeing with the government, the Court finds

that the second paragraph of § 3237(a) does apply).
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involving the ... transportation in interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 United States Code § 3237(a).82

The government

maintained that because the charged offense involved
transportation in interstate commerce, it was a continuing
offense for purposes of § 3237(a).83

This assertion is tenable,

however, since the assault occurred on a plane, the offense
itself implicated interstate commerce.84

Here, the conduct

constituting the offense was the assault, which had to do with
interstate commerce.85

82

As Lozoya notes, “the jurisdictional

See id. at 1239 (explaining how in part does not apply to the

case at hand because the crime did not involve transportation in
interstate commerce but rather it occurred in one precise
location).
83

See id. at 1240 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the

government argued that under the statute the crime was
continuing and can be prosecuted in any of the districts flown
over).
84

See id. at 1240 (distinguishing the application of the

Rodriquez-Moreno inquiry from the Ninth Circuit and the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning).
85

See id. at 1230 (establishing that the crime that occurred

took place across interstate commerce and the statute applies to
the case because the crime was committed on a place in
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element requiring the offense to have occurred on an aircraft
does not convert the offense to one that involves transportation
in interstate commerce.”86

The court argued that even if it

could be so construed, if would not be a conduct element of the
offense, but rather a circumstance element that does not support
venue.87

This reasoning is incorrect because as Breitweiser

established, any crime from, through, or into the interstate
commerce is fair game in which the prosecution can bring their
case.88
The Ninth Circuits interpretation of 3237(a) must be
rejected because it did not correctly analyze the conduct of

interstate commerce).
86

See id. at 1234 (quoting the reasoning of the Court in Lozoya

and incorrectly arguing that just because a crime occurs on a
plane does that mean that the crime involves transportation in
interstate commerce).
87

See id. at 1245 (clarifying that it will take more than just

committing a crime on a plane to determine venue, but rather the
plaintiff will have to establish at exactly what place in the
flight plan the crime occurred).
88

See id. at 1244 (disagreeing with the holding in Lozoya and

arguing that the precedent established in Rodriguez-Moreno was
incorrectly applied).
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crime as required by Rodriguez-Moreno.89

The Ninth Circuit

argued that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits misinterpreted the
statute and instead, the court merely reiterated that even by a
bulk of the evidence, it would be arduous, if not futile for the
government to determine which federal district was below the
plane when the defendant committed the crime.90

Additionally,

the Court argued that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits improperly
relied on United States v. McCulley’s reasoning, that § 3237 was
constructed to counter criminal evading retribution when there
was a lack of a venue.91
Judge Owens dissents in Lozoya, finding that the venue
provision at issue—the second paragraph of 18 United States Code

89

See id. at 1235 (emphasizing that the Tenth and Eleventh

Circuits’ reasoning and application of the Rodriguez-Moreno
inquiry must be applied to the Lozoya case and any future cases
that face the same dilemma).
90

See id. at 1237 (arguing that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits

were too eager to find venue and in turn the defendant was faced
with undue burden and hardship).
91

See id. at 1240 (highlighting how the Tenth and Eleventh

Circuits were more focused on finding a venue to bring the case
regardless of the burden on the defendant).
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§ 3237(a)—could be clearer.92

However, he argued, like the

Supreme Court advised, interpretations that formulate illogical
results should be avoided.93

The Judge correctly agreed with the

Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and found that the “transportation
in interstate . . . commerce” language in § 3237(a) covered the
conduct at issue here.94

The Judge argued that the Tenth and

Eleventh Circuits opinions were not tenure track in their
analyses, but not every legal question requires a law review
article, sometimes common sense is enough.95

Finally, the Judge

argued that venue in criminal cases protects defendants’ rights

92

See id. at 1241 (dissenting and finding that it would be

impossible to determine the exact location of where a crime took
place in an airplane).
93

See id. at 1236 (suggesting that the courts should look to the

statutory language to help clarify this confusion and calls on
the Supreme Court to clarify this language to help mitigate the
several different rulings).
94

See id. at 1236 (arguing how it is clear what Congress was

trying to establish and that the courts should follow the
statutory interpretation provided).
95

See id. at 1240 (discussing how some issues are straight

forward).
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to a fair trial.96

But here, limiting venue to a flyover state,

where the defendant and potential witnesses have no ties, makes
no sense.97

In contrast, a prosecution in the landing district

creates no unfairness to defendants.98
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted the plain
language of 18 United States Code § 3237 and created an
irrational split among the circuits.99

The first prong of

§ 3237(a), the Temporal Prong— “any offense against the United
States begun in one district and completed in another, or

96

See id. at 1241 (reiterating how it protects defendants but

there is in a case involving airplanes it does not make sense to
find venue over the district where the crime was committed).
97

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (dissenting with the court, Judge Brown discusses how it
would be extremely difficult for the government to prove exactly
where the crime took place in the air, not only in this case but
in future similar cases).
98

See id. at 1238 (explaining how it does not create an

unfairness to defendants especially if the defendant is guilty).
99

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (holding that the district court incorrectly established
venue in the district where the plane landed rather than the
district where the crime was committed).
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committed in more than one district, may be . . . prosecuted in
any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or
completed” seems quite clearly meant to apply to crimes which
are still being committed when district lines are crossed, as
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits held.100
The issue in dispute among the circuits is the second prong
of § 3237(a), the Commerce Prong— “any offense involving the use
of . . . transportation in interstate or foreign commerce . . .
is a continuing offense . . . and may be . . . ”101

In other

words, when a crime involves air travel as an essential element
to its success, it then falls under the Commerce Prong because
it involved an offense involving the use of transportation.102
100

See id. at 1234 (defining what it means to commit an offense

in more than one district and where the trial can be held. Also,
distinguishing that the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits were
not in dispute about this section of the statute).
101

See id. at 1235 (distinguishing the actual area in dispute

among the circuits because of the different interpretations of
the statute).
102

See id. at 1235 (defining involving the use, and how the

Ninth Circuit interpreted the statue to mean that the airplane
must be engaged as a participant of the crime to determine their
holding).
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However, the Ninth Circuit’s position is that the airplane was
not a part of the essential element and was not engaged as a
participant of the crime just because the crime took place on
the plane does not mean it was involving the use of
transportation.103

The Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted the

statute.104
Defendants are not receiving an unfair burden or undue
hardship when the venue is chosen outside of the State and
district where the crime is committed because they can request a
change in venue.105

103

The Sixth Amendment establishes the rights

See id. at 1234 (indicating that an air travel crime would

only apply under the Commerce Prong if the air travel was a
participant in the crime. For example, drug trafficking via air
commercial air travel).
104

See id. at 1239 (rejecting the district court’s holding and

the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ holding, the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly ruled in Lozoya and should have found venue where
the plane landed).
105

See Scott Kafker, The Right to Venue and the Right to an

Impartial Jury: Resolving the Conflict in the Federal
Constitution, 52 U Chi L. Rev 729, 730 (1985) (discussing how in
some criminal cases, courts have had to change venue because of
the pretrial publicity and the risks of prejudice to the
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to a defendant in a criminal trial.106
the right to an impartial jury.107

The amendment addresses

Traditionally, courts have

granted a change of venue in situations where the defendants
constitutional rights are in jeopardy.108

It is essential for

courts to grant a defendant a proper venue to guarantee the
constitutional right to a fair trial.109

The determination can

defendant).
106

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing the rights of a

defendant when accused of a crime, which include: the right to a
speedy trial, public trial, impartial jury, and notice of the
accusation).
107

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to a trial by

an unbiased jury under the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, the
prosecutor and defense attorney interview potential jurors to
ensure impartiality and later choose who becomes a part of the
jury).
108

See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1971) (holding

that in some cases, a change of venue is required to ensure an
impartial jury).
109

See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 273 (1944)

(affirming the district courts holding in granting venue where
the crime was completed and not allowing the defendants to be
hauled across the country for trial under the Federal Denture
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impose undue hardship by forcing the defendant to defend in an
environment alien to her in the course of litigation.110
The Ninth Circuit erred in finding proper venue in the district
where the crime occurred because it would be impossible to
pinpoint the exact location of where the crime took place.111
The Framers issued the section on trials being held in the place
where the crime occurred to ensure fairness to the defendants.112
However, the Ninth Circuits argument is founded on the testimony
of a flight attendant who was told that an assault occurred at
least an hour after takeoff.113

The flight attendant also stated

Act).
110

See id. at 250 (addressing the concerns of the court and its

desire to ensure fairness to the defendant in its trial by
allowing the litigation to take place where the crime took
place).
111

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (arguing that it would be wildly unreasonable for the
government to have to locate the exact location of not only this
crime but any future crimes that occurred on a plane).
112

See id. at 29 (discussing the potential trauma that could

occur when asking a victim (especially a child) to discuss the
precise timeline of their sexual assault).
113

See id. at 24 (highlighting the difficulty it would be to
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that during the flight, which lasted approximately three hours,
he received word of an assault. The flight attendant spent 30 to
45 minutes investigating the incident. During the investigation,
the captain made an announcement that the aircraft would soon be
landing-which usually occurs twenty-five minutes before
landing.114

The Ninth Circuit argued that with the testimony

and flight data plan the government could pinpoint exactly where
the crime took place.115

However, this rationale is unreasonable

and ridiculous because it simply is not feasible, not only in
this case but in future cases because it could potentially be
unreliable.116

The Ninth Circuit wanted to ensure fairness to

rely on one person’s testimony and ability to account for
detailed memories and find the exact location of where the crime
was committed even with the help of the flight data).
114

See id. at 23 (identifying the exact point in time the

assault occurred based on circumstantial evidence, such as
average speed of the plane and the districts it flew over during
its flight time).
115

See id. at 24 (addressing the difficulty in precision when a

crime takes place in the air over multiple circuits, districts,
and airports in close proximity).
116

See id. at 29 (dissenting with the Ninth Circuits decision,

the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits argued that the Ninth Circuits
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the defendant and prevent the defendant from traveling to a
foreign environment.117

But what difference will it make if the

defendant is tried in the pinpoint venue or the venue in which
the plane landed when it could potentially still be an
environment alien to him?118

The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits

were correct in finding venue in a district where a plane lands
or in any of the districts that it flies over because it will
not make a difference to a defendant.119

holding could potentially apply to other cases and it will apply
to any crime not just sexual assault, but also murder and
theft).
117

See id. at 24 (questioning whether it would be unfair for the

defendant to travel to any of the districts over the flight plan
versus traveling to the district where the plane landed when
potential witnesses would have to travel to the foreign venue
either way).
118

See id. (examining the reality of the Ninth Circuits holding

when it is clear that each case will be different and each
testimony might not be so precise).
119

See id. (evaluating whether a defendant would care if he is

tried in one rather than another of the states over which the
plane flew over when he would have to travel regardless unless
he is from one of the flown over districts).
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The Ninth Circuit incorrectly argued that based on the
Constitution, the Rodriguez-Moreno inquiry, and case law that
venue should be found in the district the crime occurred.120

The

Ninth Circuit argued that based on their findings the crime
could not have occurred in the district in which the prosecution
brought its charges.121

The court disagreed with the Tenth and

Eleventh Circuits interpretation in that venue could be brought
in any district in which the crime took place because it is
unfair to the defendant.122
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted Title 18 United

120

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (arguing that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits were correct
in their statutory interpretations and applied the RodriquezMoreno inquiry correctly because statutory interpretations which
would produce absurd results are to be avoided).
121

See id. at 26 (concluding that because the prosecution does

not dispute that the assault ended before the aircraft entered
the airspace of where the charges were brought then the venue
had to be improper).
122

See id. at 29 (discussing under the majority rule, the

government must prove which district-not merely which state- an
airplane was flying over when the crime was committed).
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States Code § 3237 as applied to Breitweiser and Cope.123

The

statute establishes that if a crime is committed in multiple
districts, meaning that if a crime starts in one district and
ends in another through the use of transportation, then the
defendant can be prosecuted in anyone of the districts in which
she passed through.124

In Cope, the Tenth Circuit established

that because Cope was under the influence of alcohol during the
flight and

was operating a common carrier in interstate

commerce, it was immaterial whether he was under the influence

123

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th

Cir. 2004) (holding that venue can only be proper in the
district where the airplane landed); see generally United States
v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1221 (2012) (holding that the
prosecution can bring a lawsuit in any one of the districts in
which a crime was carried out through the use of
transportation); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237 (West 2019) (detailing
Congress’s decision to implement this section to establish a
means of finding proper venue in crimes involving
transportation).
124

See Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1221 (2012) (outlining the necessary

criteria to establish venue involving crimes that occur in more
than one district).
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of alcohol in Colorado.125

It was then established that venue

could be brought in the District of Colorado because the
government showed that the crime took place on a form of
transportation in interstate commerce.126

So, venue was proper

in any district through which Cope traveled on the flight,
including the District of Colorado.127

The only thing the

government needs to show is that the evidence proves that the
defendant passed through the district.128

125

See id. at 1221 (distinguishing the irrelevance of the

defendant being under the influence to determine that venue was
proper in the District of Colorado).
126

See id. at 1225 (finding that in order to establish that

venue was proper in the District of Colorado the government only
had to show that the crime took place on a plane, car, boat,
etc. and crossed multiple districts).
127

See id. at 1225 (deciding that because the crime took place

on a plane that crossed through the District of Colorado then
venue was proper, and the government met its burden).
128

See id. at 1225 (reiterating that the government needed to

show that the defendant was traveling through the District of
Colorado at the time the crime took place, which they
established so the court affirmed the district court’s opinion
and granted venue in the District of Colorado).
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If the defendant believes that the venue is improper, the
accused may request a change of venue for reasons of prejudice,
convenience, plea or sentence.129

Therefore, there is a remedy

that relieves the argument of unfairness and undue burden and
hardship.130

However, to receive a change of venue, defendants

must show that they cannot receive a fair trial under the
current circumstances.131

That reasonable likelihood is usually

due to pretrial publicity, but it could have to do with some
other event making it almost impossible to find an impartial

129

See Charles Doyle, Venue: An Abridged Legal Analysis of Where

a Federal Crime May be Tried, FEDERATION

OF

AMERICAN

SCIENTISTS

(Dec.

6, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22361.pdf (explaining
the remedy the defendant has if she believes that the court
granted an improper venue or the defendant can waive trial in a
proper venue either explicitly or by failing to object to
prosecution in an improper venue in a timely manner).
130

See id. (recognizing that the defendant does receive justice

when given the option of requesting a change of venue).
131

See id. (requiring that a defendant show the court that they

received an unjust ruling by proving she will receive an
impartial jury in the venue, pretrial publicity, prejudice by a
judge, etc.).
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jury.132
IV.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The Ninth Circuit ended its opinion by calling on

Congressional action.133

“Congress can . . .

enact a new

statute to remedy any irrationality that might follow from our
conclusion.134

Indeed [we hope] that Congress will address this

issue by establishing a just, sensible, and clearly articulated
venue rule for this and similar airborne offenses.”135

It is

imperative that Congress enact a law that will rectify the Ninth

132

See id. (discussing additional reasons why a defendant might

request a change of venue in a district granted to the
prosecution).
133

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (concurring in part and dissenting in part with the court,
Judge Owen urges either the Supreme Court or Congress to
establish a venue rule that is fair).
134

See id. at 1240 (Owens, J., dissenting) (suggesting Congress

enact a new law to correct the split amongst the Circuits).
135

See id. at 1240 (continuing his desire for Congress to enact

a new law, Justice Owens emphasizes the need to establish a
clear and candid law to resolve the dilemma among the circuits).
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Circuits opinion.136

Without a clear statute for courts to

follow criminals will continue to escape convictions because of
improper venue.137
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted the language of §
3237(a) and this interpretation is not good policy.138

The Tenth

and Eleventh Circuits addressed the difficulty of establishing
proper venue and even claimed that it may be impossible for the
government to prove.139

136

See id. at 1245 (resolving this dilemma is necessary to

ensure justice to the victims of potential crimes involving an
aircraft).
137

See id. at 1245 (disagreeing with the court Judge Owen

discusses how without precision that the majority requires,
prosecutions of violent crimes on board aircraft could be
impossible and result in dismissal).
138

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (describing how the court found that 18 U.S. Code §
3237(a) was not applicable and how it was just to find venue in
the exact district where the crime was committed).
139

See United Statesd

v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004) (arguing that
proper venue is in the district where the plane landed and not
exactly where the crime took place).
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The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the testimony of the
lead flight attendant in its case.140

To pinpoint the exact

district in which the crime took place based off of flight plans
and data is already insufficient, but to base it off an
unreliable witness who was alerted by the crime by another
passenger is even more inadequate.141

It would be irresponsible

of courts to establish proper venue off of the testimony of a
busy flight attendant and flight plans.142

Additionally, if

courts were to allow this type of evidence to be the basis of
establishing venue, they will be entrusting flight attendants to
handle the immediate investigation of the crime and the
responsibility of marking the exact time and place the crime
occurred.143

140

See Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1234 (relying heavily on the flight

attendant’s testimony the Ninth Circuit overruled the district
court’s holding and remanded the case).
141

See id. at 1233 (criticizing the majorities holding, Justice

Owens distinguishes the need to find more reliable evidence in
proving venue that can be more sufficient).
142

See id. at 1233 (reiterating the need to establish a system

that has more safeguards to ensure accuracy amongst the other
circuits).
143

See id. at 1235 (highlighting how difficult it would be for
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Finally, how can the court argue that finding venue exactly
where the crime took place rather than where the plane landed is
fair?144

If the entire purpose of venue is to prevent undue

burden and hardship to the accused by not holding a trial in an
environment alien to the defendant, then finding venue in a
flyover district is not any less fair than finding venue where
the plane landed.145

One can argue that finding venue exactly

where the crime took place is more burdensome to the defendant
because the defendant may not have any dealings in that
district.146

However, by finding venue where the plane lands,

courts to ask so much of flight attendants when crimes are
committed on a plane).
144

See id. at 1234 (questioning how the courts reasoning is

illogical and lacks a true basis in finding venue in the
district in which the crime was committed).
145

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.

2004) (arguing how the defendant will still be burdened whether
in a flyover district or in the district where the plane has
landed; however, the court wants to establish continuity by
finding venue where the plane lands).
146

See id. at 1255 (inferring that finding venue where the plane

lands is not anymore burdensome to the defendant because there
is no guarantee that the flyover state will be any less
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there’s a possibility that the defendant may have family,
friends, or even may call the district home.147

If the defendant

believes that she is still burdened then she can request a
change in venue.148
V.

CONCLUSION
When comparing the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits

holdings it is clear that the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the
two-part Rodriguez-Moreno test and 18 U.S. Code § 3237(a)
completely differently from the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.149

burdensome).
147

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (noting that there is always a chance that the defendant
may have to travel to an environment alien to her because the
crime was committed on an airplane that may pass through
multiple districts).
148

See id. at 1240 (rejecting the courts reasoning Justice Owens

argued that the defendant always has the right to request a
change in venue to a district less burdensome to her and her
potential witnesses).
149

See id. at 1230 (splitting from the Tenth and Eleventh

Circuits the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Rodriguez-Moreno test
and 18 U.S. Code § 3237(a) to find venue proper in the district
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The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that venue was proper in
the district in which the airplane landed.150

The government met

its burden by showing that the crime took place on a form of
transportation in interstate commerce and the claim could be
brought in anyone of the districts in which the crime took
place.151

The Ninth Circuit split from the Tenth and Eleventh

Circuits and found that the Rodriguez-Moreno test did not
apply.152

Additionally, they argued that § 3237(a) was not

where the crime was committed).
150

See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th

Cir. 2004) (holding that venue can only be proper in the
district where the airplane landed or in any district that the
plane flew over to ensure fairness to the defendant, witnesses,
and jurors); see generally United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219,
1221 (2012) (holding that the prosecution can bring a lawsuit in
any one of the districts in which a crime was carried out
through the use of transportation).
151

See id. at 1221 (vacating the holding in Lozoya, the Tenth

Circuit established that the prosecution could bring their case
in anyone of the districts the place passed over).
152

See United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.

2019) (declining the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits holding, the
Ninth Circuit argued that venue would not be held where the
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applicable to establish venue in the district in which the plane
landed because the crime did not take place in the district in
which the plane landed.153
While it may seem like this is a difficult query for some,
there is a simple and straightforward solution.154

By finding

venue where the plane lands this will eliminate potential
inconsistent testimonies from witnesses in determining the exact
pinpoint of where the crime took place.155

Additionally, if

courts were to apply the ruling in the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits holdings there will be a potential decrease in the
amount of defendants escaping conviction based off improper

plane landed because it could prove exactly where the crime took
place).
153

See id. at 1233 (arguing that the statute did not apply to

their case, the Ninth Circuit rejected the prior holdings and
set forth their own interpretation of the statute).
154

See id. at 1233 (providing a solution to this split, Judge

Owens suggests to the court that they should find venue where
the plane lands because it will be impossible to locate the
venue exactly where the crime took place).
155

See id. at 1233 (underlining the future errors that may arise

if the courts continue to follow the Ninth Circuits holding and
not find venue where the plane lands).
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venue.156

156

See id. at 1233 (suggesting that there can be a decrease in

the amount of defendants that slip through the cracks and escape
conviction based on improper venue).
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